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AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELEASEDISMISSAL AGREEMENT
ERIN
I.

P. BARTHOLOMY*
INTRODUCTION

A phenomenon exists in the criminal justice world which
allows a prosecutor to strike a bargain with a criminal defendant, permitting them both to cut their losses and walk away
from a mutually bad situation. On occasions where arrested
individuals may have been wronged by public officials in the
course of their arrests, prosecutors may legally agree to dismiss
defendants' criminal charges in exchange for releases by the
defendants of any civil claims arising from the arrests.
The release-dismissal agreement, and variations upon its
theme,' have been the subject of controversy for several years.
Its supporters rely on the obvious efficiency embodied in the
situation. Despite this efficiency, such agreements are dangerous, detrimental to the criminal justice system, and against the
better interests of society.
This article will examine cases in which the agreements
appear and the law which currently allows their existence. It
will argue that although the agreements have been allowed by
the United States Supreme Court, they are unethical and
should be prohibited by the individual state ethics organizations governing the practice of law. Section II presents specific
factual situations involving release-dismissal agreements. Section III outlines the historical legal treatment of these agreements as well as their current legal status since the Supreme
Court's analysis of the issue. Section IV considers legal ethics
and professional responsibility and argues that, according to
established norms of our profession, these agreements should
not be allowed. Finally, Section V proposes that individual
state ethics bodies should, as the Colorado Bar Association has
done, promulgate rules prohibiting public prosecutors from
entering into release-dismissal agreements.
*
B.A. 1988, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1993, Notre Dame Law
School; Thos.J. White Scholar 1991-93. My gratitude to my family, for their
love and support, and to theJournalstaff and Professor Robinson for all their
help and guidance.
1. See Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980); see also infra notes
5-8 and accompanying text.

332

II.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

THE SrruATION: CASES IN WHICH THE RELEASE-DISMISSAL
AGREEMENT APPEARS

Several instances where release-dismissal agreements have
been used will help illustrate the troubling consequences of
allowing prosecutors to release alleged criminals in exchange
for promises not to file civil complaints. Note that in each
instance cited, the beneficiaries of the agreement are the
alleged criminal and the allegedly abusive state official.
(1) In 1990, Jose Mendoza, a Salem, Oregon, man who
was shot in the face during a drug raid, says he was forced to
give up any claim against the state in exchange for the dismissal
of criminal charges.2 On the advice of his own attorney, 3 the
39-year old man, who did not speak English, signed an agreement to release the state of any civil liability for medical bills
incurred in treating the wounds to his face. In return for his
release of civil liability, the charges against Jose Mendoza,
including attempted murder, were dismissed.'
(2) Robert Jones filed civil rights claims against the county
of Multnomah, Oregon, relating to actions that occurred while
he was being held in that county's jail awaiting post-conviction
sentencing. 5 Jones alleged that "[o]n the night ofJuly 3, 1976,
he was taken from his cell, stripped, gagged, bound, chained to
a wall, hosed with cold water and beaten with a night stick. The
incident lasted 3 to 5 hours." 6 Prison officials then placed
Jones in a special segregation facility 7 and held him there for
nineteen days. On July 22, without any prior notice, Jones met
with a deputy county counsel and a claims adjuster. At that
meeting, Jones accepted $500 in return for his release of all
civil claims arising from the beating of July 3.V
2.

Man Says He Was Pressuredto Drop Claim with State, UPI, June 2, 1990.

3. "Portland lawyer Angel Lopez, who represented Mendoza on the
civil issue, said he understood his client's feelings. 'What it comes down to is
that we were prepared to do what needed to be done to get him out of this
criminal problem he was in,' Lopez said. 'I advised him of the probabilities of
winning in a civil suit. They don't look too hot.'" Id.
4.

Id.

5. Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 1201.
7. Id. at 1202. The "special segregation facility" referred to here is
quite similar to solitary confinement. Jones was denied the opportunity to
speak to other prisoners or his attorney.
8. Id. at 1201. Because the agreement in Jones was made after the
conviction and did not involve the dismissal of the defendant's charges, it
does not present a strict example of a release-dismissal agreement. It is
included here as an example of agreements that are made to prevent police
brutality claims from being brought by criminal defendants.
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(3) Chicago resident Verita Boyd alleged that upon her
refusal to acquiesce to a search of her person,9 a Chicago police
officer pushed her violently against the car she had been in,
shoved her against his police car,' ° used abusive language and
threatened her. Ms. Boyd was then arrested and incarcerated
on charges of disorderly conduct and resisting a police officer.
When she appeared for trial, the Assistant State's Attorney of
Cook County, Illinois, agreed to dismiss the charges on the
condition that Ms. Boyd execute a release from civil liability in
favor of the arresting officers and the city. She signed the
agreement. "
Examples of alleged police brutality claims abound. The
large numbers of arrests the courts have seen which are associated with legitimate complaints of constitutional violations justifies attention to this subject.' 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, t"
persons deprived of their rights by persons acting under the
color of law are entitled to redress from the actors. If their
stories are true, each of the criminal defendants described
above has meritorious civil rights claims against the arresting
9. Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975). Ms. Boyd was a
passenger in a car that was stopped and searched when she and a group of
people were driving to a high school to pick up the mother of one of the
passengers. Before attempting to search Ms. Boyd, the police searched the
car and the three other passengers and found nothing incriminating. Id. at
83.
10. Ms. Boyd claims that she was pregnant at the time of the incident
and that this assault caused her subsequent miscarriage. Id. at 85.
11. Id.
12. See Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct: Reflections
on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal
Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 851 n.l 12 (1988); see also Patzner v. Burkett, 779
F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985) (paraplegic unconstitutionally arrested in home
without warrant on charge of drunk driving, handcuffed, and dragged across
the ground to police car); Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896, 898 (7th
Cir. 1984) (while riding his bicycle, plaintiff was struck by police car; police
pushed him to the ground, subjected him and his wife to racial slurs and then
kicked him and beat him upon arrival at the hospital); Garrick v. City &
County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 970 (10th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff shot by police
officer after being stopped for making an illegal U-turn and having car
searched for drugs).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1985) states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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officers and, possibly, against the police departments or the
municipalities. 14
While many brutality claims are filed, there are also
instances of agreements to release such claims, as illustrated in
the previously cited examples. It is not-unusual for a state or
municipality to dismiss the charges against a criminal defendant in -exchange for that individual's promise not to sue the
police, the city, or the county for any civil rights violations the
arresting individuals might have caused during the arrest.' 5
While they may know that they have been wronged or brutalized, defendants, such as Jose Mendoza, often feel that their
civil rights claims are futile in light of their current situation.
While imprisoned, they feel they have little choice and, realistically, they do have minimal bargaining power. To many, the
opportunity to sign a release and walk away from a criminal
arrest seems an incredibly lucky break. And the benefits of
such agreements are not one-sided; the police escape from
their own misdeeds. While judicial economy is preserved by
obviating two trials, the net result of such an agreement is a
negative one: Suspects are dismissed without trials and officers
are relieved from responsibility for constitutional violations.
There is no retribution for the victim of the crime, no compensation for the victim of the constitutional deprivation, and, perhaps most importantly, no report to or trial by the public of
either alleged wrongdoing.
III.
A.

THE LAW

The Historical Controversy: Dixon v. District of Columbia

Until 1987, when the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the enforceability of the release-dismissal agreement," its validity was a matter of long-standing controversy. The question of whether to uphold an agreement to
trade the release of civil rights claims for the dismissal of criminal charges had been decided a number of different ways.
Some courts held that the agreements were enforceable contracts.17 Others refused to uphold such agreements and cited a
number of factual reasons, including lack of adequate consideration, coercion, and duress.' 8 Finally, at least one court has
14. See infra part IV(D) for a discussion of the application of§ 1983 and
the significance of official immunity and municipal liability.
15. See generally Kreimer, supra note 12.

16.
17.
18.

Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
See, e.g., Hoines v. Barney's Club, 620 P.2d 628 (Ca. Sup. Ct. 1980).
However, if the agreements were made voluntarily, they would have
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held that the release-dismissal agreement is never valid; that it
is per se void for public policy reasons.' 9
Although the Supreme Court has recently spoken on this
subject, opinions about the validity of release-dismissal agreements continue to vary. In its only examination of the issue,
the Supreme Court did not manage to attain a majority decision,2" so it is not surprising that feelings about these agreements remain far from settled. Prior to the Court's treatment
of the issue, though, strong support lay on the side of refusing
to allow such agreements. A leading case, Dixon v. District of
Columbia," promotes the position that release-dismissal agreements should never be enforced. Dixon set forth the facts and
reasoning that led a federal court to refuse to enforce a releasedismissal agreement.2 2 The Dixon court declared the agreements to be void as a matter of public policy and examined
what the consequences would be, in terms of the prosecution
of the criminal charges, when the defendant breaks an agreement not to sue.23
In Dixon v. District of Columbia, Dixon was stopped by
officers for traffic violations. 24 At that time he was neither
charged nor ticketed. Two days later, when he went to the station to deliver a written complaint regarding the officers'
behavior, Dixon entered into a "tacit agreement" with the Corporation Counsel's office. 25 The understanding was that Dixon
would not proceed further with his complaint and, in exchange,
the local government would not prosecute the traffic charges. 6
After three months, Dixon decided to file a formal complaint with the District of Columbia Commission's Council on
been enforceable. For the "voluntariness principle," see Bushnell v.
Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th
Cir. 1980).
19. Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1985).
20. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386. The decision to enforce
the release-dismissal agreement in that case was made by a plurality, with the
opinion written by Justice Powell, joined by concurring Justice O'Connor,
with four dissenters, led by Justice Stevens.
21. 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 966. The two violations were failing to obey the instructions
given by a police officer and stopping a vehicle in such a manner as to
obstruct the orderly flow of traffic. Id. n. 1.
25. Id. at 968. The opinion notes that the police may have been
particularly concerned with Dixon's complaint. Because he was a retired
detective, and he was black and the two officers were white, Dixon could not
easily be accused of raising illegitimate claims of police brutality. Id. n.2.
26. Id. at 968.
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Human Relations. As a result of Dixon's complaint, the case
was reopened and he was charged with the two traffic
offenses. 2 7 The prosecutor proceeded with the case and the
trial court, after granting three continuances in favor of the
prosecution, directed findings of not guilty. The government
appealed and during a conference with the trial judge ordered
by the Court of Appeals, the prosecutor "admitted that the
prosecutions were brought because appellant went back on an
agreement not to file complaints of misconduct against the
police officers who stopped him." ' 28 In their eventual hearing
of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution was
impermissibly brought and remanded the case with instruc29
tions for it to be dismissed.
The Dixon court held that there was a definite necessity to
prevent the type of agreement which the government initiated
in this case. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that "the courts may not become the 'enforcers'
of these odious agreements." 3 0° Further, judges must remove
any incentive to enter into the agreements by barring prosecutions brought against defendants who refuse to promise, or
later break a promise, not to file complaints against arresting
officers.'
The court in Dixon was concerned with the proliferation of
these agreements that would have resulted had it ruled for the
government. The court found these agreements to be "odious" for several of the reasons that motivated four Supreme
Court justices later to vote against enforcing a similar agreement.3 2 The court was specifically concerned with the failure
to prosecute valid criminal claims as well as the failure to
openly and thoroughly air complaints against the police.3 3 The
27. Id. The Chief of the Law Enforcement division of the Corporation
Counsel explained their decision to reopen the case by stating:
We had discussed it back when it originally occurred and, at the
time, everybody was happy to forget the whole thing... But three
months later he comes in and makes a formal complaint. So we said
'If you are going to play ball like that why shouldn't we proceed with
our case?'. . . I had no reason to file until he changed back on his
understanding of what we had all agreed on ....
Id.
28. Id. at 967.
29. Id. at 970.
30. Id. at 969.
31.
32.

Id.
See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
33. Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969.
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Dixon court was the first to pronounce the often-quoted fear
regarding the "major evil" of these agreements: "[T]hey tempt
the prosecutor to trump up charges for use in bargaining for
suppression of the complaint. 3' 4 According to the D.C. Circuit, "The danger of concocted charges is particularly great
because complaints against the police usually arise in connection with arrests for extremely vague offenses such as disorderly conduct or resisting arrest." 5 Following this reasoning,
the Dixon holding would invalidate all release-dismissal
agreements.
Dixon v. District of Columbia set the groundwork for close to
two decades of controversy over the enforceability of the
release-dismissal agreement. Federal and state courts all over
the country followed the decision," many holding the agreements void as against public policy. While the Supreme Court
eventually promulgated a different rule, a strong dissent clearly
enumerated the problems inherent in the release-dismissal
agreement.
B.

Town of Newton v. Rumery: Enforcing the
Release-DismissalAgreement

The question of the enforceability of the release-dismissal
agreement, addressed in Dixon v. District of Columbia, was argued
and decided before the Supreme Court in Town of Newton v.
Rumery.3 7 A plurality headed by Justice Powell, and joined by
concurring Justice O'Connor, held that a release-dismissal
agreement between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor is
not necessarily unenforceable. In its decision to uphold the
particular agreement in this situation, the Court refused to find
a per se rule of invalidity.
The case arose from the following facts. David Champy, a
friend of Bernard Rumery's, was indicted for aggravated felonious sexual assault. After learning of the charges from a local
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Brian L. Fielkow, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-BuyingJustice: The Role of
Release-Dismissal Agreements in the CriminalJustice System, 78 J. Crim. L. 1119
n. 138 and accompanying text (1988); see also Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88
(7th Cir. 1975); Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
Brothers v. Rosauer's Supermarkets, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (D. Mont.
1982); Horne v. Pane, 514 F. Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Williamsen v.
Jernberg, 99 Ill. App. 2d 371, 375 (1968); Gray v. City of Galesburg, 247
N.W.2d 338 (Mich. App. 1976); Kurlander v. Davis, 427 N.Y.S.2d 376, 381
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
37. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
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newspaper, Rumery phoned Mary Deary, an acquaintance of
both himself and Champy. Deary was the victim of the assault
in question and was expected to testify as the principal witness
in the case against Champy. Deary was apparently upset by the
substance of the phone call from Rumery and she subsequently
contacted the Town of Newton's Chief of Police. Deary told
the police that Rumery had attempted to force her to drop the
charges against Champy and that Rumery had threatened her if
she continued to go ahead with the charges. Rumery was then
arrested on charges of tampering with a witness, a class B felony in New Hampshire.
After the arrest, Rumery's attorney reached an agreement
with the Deputy County Attorney under which the Prosecutor
would dismiss all charges against Rumery if Rumery would
agree not to sue the town, its officials, or Deary for any harm3"
caused by the arrest. The District Court found that Rumery's
attorney presented the agreement to Rumery and explained to
him that he would have to forego all civil actions if he accepted
the agreement.3s After three days, during which time Rumery
was not in custody, he signed the agreement and the charges
were dropped.
Ten months later Rumery filed suit,4 ° alleging that the
town and its officials had violated his constitutional rights by
arresting him, defaming him, and falsely imprisoning him. The
Town of Newton moved for dismissal of the civil case with the
release-dismissal agreement serving as an affirmative defense.
At the trial level, Rumery unsuccessfully argued that the agreement was unenforceable as a violation of public policy. The
District Court rejected Rumery's argument and dismissed his
civil case, holding that a release of a § 1983 claim may be valid
if it results from a voluntary, deliberate and informed decision.4" The court further found that Rumery's decision
resulted from a careful analysis of the situation, and was therefore voluntary; accordingly, they dismissed his suit.4 2
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, adopting a per se rule invalidating release-dismissal agreements.43
The First Circuit was concerned with the coercive nature of the
agreements as well as their infringement on important public
38. For example, defamation of character or false arrest, which were
the bases of Rumery's later § 1983 suit.
39. 480 U.S. at 390.
40. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
41. 480 U.S. at 391.
42. Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1985).
43. Id.
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interests. In holding that such agreements are never enforceable, the court stated:
It is difficult to envision how release agreements, negotiated in exchange for a decision not to prosecute, serve
the public interest. Enforcement of such covenants
would tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction
to a defendant's civil rights claim, suppress evidence of
police misconduct, and leave unremedied deprivations of
constitutional rights.4 4
The United States Supreme Court granted the town's petition for a writ of certiorari,4 5 and in the plurality opinion, Justice Powell4 6 stated the issue: "The question in this case is
whether a court properly may enforce an agreement in which a
criminal defendant releases his right to file an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending
criminal charges." 4 7
Justice Powell began his opinion by stating that the source
of the relevant legal authority is the common law principle that
a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by
enforcement of the agreement. 48 He placed the issue and the
Court's position in perspective by stating:
The Court of Appeals concluded that the public interests
related to release-dismissal agreements justified a per se
rule of invalidity. We think the court overstated the perceived problems and also failed to credit the significant
public interests that such agreements can further. Most
importantly, the Court of Appeals did not consider the
wide variety of factual situations that can result in
release-dismissal agreements. Thus, although we agree
that in some cases these agreements may infringe important interest of the criminal defendant and of society as a
whole, we do not believe that the mere possibility of
49
harm to these interests calls for a per se rule.
Justice Powell's plurality opinion systematically rejected
the Court of Appeals' two arguments. He began by responding
44. Id.
45. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
46. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White
and Justice Scalia. Justice O'Connor concurred in the decision and parts of
the opinion.
47. Rumety, 480 U.S. at 389.

48. Id. at 392 n.2 (quoting
§ 178(1)
49. (1981)).
Id.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

340

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

to the argument that these agreements are "inherently coercive."50 While the Court agreed that some release-dismissal
agreements "may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision,"'" it concluded that the possibility of an involuntary decision does not justify invalidating all release-dismissal
52
agreements.
The Court based its rejection of. the theory of inherent
coerciveness on two grounds. First, in other contexts criminal
defendants are required "to make difficult choices that effectively waive constitutional rights.""3 Second, in many cases the
defendant's decision to enter into the agreement reflects "a
highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of escaping
criminal prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action."' 54 Based on the fact that the defendant
was a sophisticated businessman, that he was not in jail at the
time of the agreement, and that he was represented by an
experienced criminal lawyer, the plurality concluded that
Rumery's decision was such a rational judgment.5 5
Because, as the Court found, Rumery's decision to enter
into the agreement was voluntary, "the public interest opposing involuntary waiver of constitutional rights is no reason to
hold this agreement invalid." 5' 6 In accordance with these findings, the Court held that the mere possibility of coercion in the
making of these agreements is insufficient to
justify a per se
57
invalidation of release-dismissal agreements.
The second argument justifying the First Circuit's holding
was the significant public interests that invalidating release-dismissal agreements would serve.5" Specifically, the Appellate
Court sought to protect the public interest in revealing police
misconduct and in preventing prosecutors from the temptation
'
to "trump up charges." 59
The Supreme Court challenged
50. Id. at 393 ("It is unfair to present a criminal defendant with a choice
between facing criminal charges and waiving his right to sue under § 1983.").
51. Id. ("The risk, publicity, and expense of a criminal trial may
intimidate a defendant, even if he believes his defense is meritorious.").
52. Id.
53. Id. ("[I]t is well settled that plea bargaining does not violate the
Constitution even though a guilty plea waives important constitutional rights
.... We see no reason to believe that release-dismissal agreements pose a
more coercive choice than other situations we have accepted.").
54. Id. at 394.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
778 F.2d at 69.

59.

Id.
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these two bases of public interest and found the public interest
in enforcing and allowing the agreements to be more significant. Noting that not all § 1983 suits are meritorious, the plurality found that "[t]o the extent release-dismissal agreements
protect public officials from the burdens of defending such
unjust claims," they further an important public interest.6"
Additionally, the Court attacked per se invalidation of the
agreements because such action "assumes that prosecutors will
seize the opportunity for wrongdoing."'" Citing their own rule
that courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to
whom to prosecute,6 2 and noting that judicial deference to
prosecutorial discretion has long been recognized, the Court
felt properly reluctant to assume prosecutorial misconduct will
necessarily arise from the availability of release-dismissal
agreements. Concluding that, "because release-dismissal
agreements may further legitimate prosecutorial and public
interests," the Court rejected the view promulgated by the
lower court that all such agreements are per se invalid.6 3
After determining that release-dismissal agreements are
not inherently coercive and that they can serve legitimate public interests, the Court further held that the specific agreement
in Rumery's case should be enforced because it was entered
into voluntarily.'
Reversing the holding of the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "this agreement was voluntary, that there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct,
and that enforcement of this agreement would not adversely
affect the relevant public interests." 6 5 Implicit in the Supreme
Court's decision was a new rule that if a release-dismissal
agreement were made voluntarily and if the public interests
would be benefitted by the agreement, it should be enforced.6 6
60. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 396:
No one suggests that all such suits are meritorious. Many are
marginal and some are frivolous. Yet even when the risk of ultimate
liability is negligible, the burden of defending such lawsuits is
substantial. Counsel may be retained by the official, as well as the
governmental entity. Preparation for trial, and the trial itself, will
require the time and attention of the defendant officials, to the
detriment of their public duties. In some cases litigation will extend
over a period of years. This diversion of officials from their normal
duties and the inevitable expense of defending even unjust claims is
distinctly not in the public interest.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 397.
64. Id. at 398.
65. Id.
66. Id. The public benefits that derived from this particular agreement
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For practical purposes, the Court stated that a "voluntariness"
standard would now govern issues of enforceability of releasedismissal agreements.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's opinion to disapprove the Court of Appeals broad holding that release-dismissal agreements are void as against public policy under all
circumstances. 6 7 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor further
agreed that the enforceability of these contracts should be
decided on a case-by-case approach which "appropriately balances the important interests on both sides of the question of
the enforceability of these agreements." 6 s Justice O'Connor
agreed with the plurality
that Bernard Rumery's covenant not
69
to sue was enforceable.
The concurrence set out the specific factors that should be
considered in the decision to enforce the agreement and
emphasized that the party seeking to enforce the agreement
bears the burden of proving that it was entered into voluntarily
and that it was not an abuse of the criminal process. Justice
O'Connor's analysis resembled the District Court's ruling and
basically restated that court's voluntariness test. Relevant factors include: the experience of the criminal defendant, the circumstances of the release, the availability of counsel, and the
nature of the criminal charge. 70 Also significant, but not necessary, is whether the agreement was executed under judicial
supervision.
According to the concurrence, release-dismissal agreements are respectable because much § 1983 litigation is meritless and "the inconvenience and distraction of public officials
caused by such suits is not inconsiderable." 7' Justice
O'Connor also believed that the agreements may actually serve
"bona fide criminal justice goals" and she cited protection of
Mary Deary as such a legitimate goal.72 The agreement served
criminal justice, according to Justice O'Connor, by sparing
included the facts that the agreement served judicial economy in that it
foreclosed both a criminal and a civil trial and that it spared Mary Deary from
"the public scrutiny and embarrassment she would have endured if she had
had to testify in either of those cases." Id.
67. Id. at 399.
68. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 401. Justice O'Connor stated that the greater the charge, the
less likely that the agreement will be voluntary and the greater the coercive
effect. Id.
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 399, 403. This was an important point forJustice O'Connor;
she felt strongly that protection of the complaining witness is a large
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Deary the rigors of testifying in two cases in which she was the
complaining, principal, and only witness. Justice O'Connor
further grounded her praise of the release-dismissal agreement
on its cost-efficiency to the local community who should be
spared the expense of litigation associated with some minor
which there is little or no public interest in
crimes for 73
prosecuting.
Justice O'Connor departed from the plurality in that she
extensively examined the dangers involved in the release-dismissal agreement. She concurred with the possibility of temptation for the prosecutor to file "trumped up charges" in an
attempt to exonerate a tortious police officer. 4 Justice
O'Connor also mentioned the converse, and equally significant, "temptation" accompanying these bargains - the problem of dropping meritorious criminal charges for the purpose
of protecting the municipality from civil claims. 75 The concurrence was further concerned about introducing extraneous civil
concerns into the criminal justice process and stated that the
central problem with the agreement was "that public criminal
justice interests are explicitly traded against the private financial interest of the individuals involved in the arrest and prosecution. ' 76 Even with these significant harms poised
precariously over the integrity of the criminal justice system,
Justice O'Connor stated that "[n]evertheless, the dangers of
the release-dismissal agreement do not preclude its enforcement in all cases." 7 7
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

Between the extremes of the Dixon court and the Rumery
plurality, the Rumety dissent took a moderate position on the
issue of the validity of the release-dismissal agreement. Led by
Justice Stevens, the dissenters sided neither with those who
argue for the per se rule against enforceability nor with the plurality who found merit in those agreements that were not
defectively negotiated. After considering the issue, the Rumery
incentive to enter into a release-dismissal agreement and the existence of this
incentive will enhance the agreement's enforceability.
73. Id. at 400. However, the Class B felony for which Rumery was
charged with the possibility of up to seven years in prison (N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 641:5(I)(b) (1986)) does not seem to fall into the category of a "minor
crime" that supportsJustice O'Connor's reasoning.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 401.
77. Id.
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dissent concluded that while they were hesitant to adopt an
absolute rule invalidating the agreements, the enactment of
§ 1983 mandates a strong presumption against the agreements. 78 Because the strong presumption against enforcing
the agreements may be overcome only by facts and policies that
were not present in the Rumeiy case, Justices Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun
voted not to uphold the specific agree79
ment in that case.
To support their differing conclusion, the dissent offered
several lines of reasoning. First, Justice Stevens argued that
even though Rumery's decision to enter into the agreement
was deliberate, informed, and voluntary, that fact does not
address two important objections to its enforcement: The
agreement is inherently coercive and the bargain exacts a price
unrelated to the defendant's own conduct. 80
The Rumery dissent contended that defendants should not
be faced with the dilemma of choosing between trial (and possible conviction) and surrendering their civil rights claims. The
dissent condemned that situation by stating:
Even an intelligent and informed, but completely innocent, person accused of crime should not be required to
choose between a threatened indictment and trial, with
their attendant publicity and the omnipresent possibility
of wrongful conviction, and surrendering the right to a
civil remedy against individuals who have violated his or
her constitutional rights.8"
Justice Stevens noted that Rumery's choice to sign the
agreement was made with advice of counsel and after three
days of reflection. Consequently, he agreed with the plurality
in their determination that it was a voluntary and intelligent
decision.8 " Yet, while the dissent conceded that this contract
was voluntary, it found no reason to conclude the agreement
was enforceable simply because it was voluntarily entered into.
Comparing this bargain to a promise to pay a patrol officer
twenty dollars for not issuing a speeding ticket, Justice Stevens
submitted that "the deliberate and rational character of
78. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 411. The dissent's first argument is summarized by Justice
Stevens' statement that "[t]he prosecutor's offer to drop charges if the
defendant accedes to the agreement is inherently coercive; moreover, the
agreement exacts a price unrelated to the character of the defendant's own
conduct." Id.
81. Id. at 405.
82. Id. at 408.
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[Rumery's] decision is not a sufficient reason for concluding
that the agreement is enforceable. 8' 3 There may be nothing
irrational about agreeing to bribe a police officer, yet no court
would enforce such a contract. The same should be the case,
argued the dissent, with the bargain formed between the Town
of Newton's prosecutor and Rumery.
After stating that the release-dismissal agreement is inherently coercive, even if rationally negotiated, the dissent emphasized the further unfairness of this bargain because of the lack
of mutuality of advantage between the prosecutor and the
defendant.8 4 According to Justice Stevens, this case involves
the functional equivalent of a citizen's paying money, represented by waiving the possibility of damages in a civil claim, for
85
the dismissal of a charge that the prosecution has not proven.
The extension of this logic leads to the conclusion that the
mutuality of advantage will only grow more disparate in proportion to the certainty of the innocence of the defendant and
the wrongfulness of the police officer's actions. Justice Stevens
based that conclusion on his theory that prosecutors' strongest
interests in entering into these agreements exist when they
realize that defendants are innocent and wrongly accused. 8 6
Ironically, that is precisely the situation in which the criminal
charges should be dropped regardless of the extenuating circumstances.8 7 Such an easy exoneration as the bargain
presented here should not be an option for the municipality
and the tortious actors.
The plurality and the concurrence both stated that some
§ 1983 claims are meritless or even frivolous. 8 8 However, even
if that assumption is true, Justice Stevens argued, those claims,
as well as the criminal charges suffering from the same criti83. Id.
84. Id. at 410.
85. Stevens examined the lack of evidence against Rumery and cited
specifically the facts that the complaining witness was unwilling to testify at
trial, that there was no written statement on which to base the arrest and that
Rumery was never indicted. Id. at 405.
86. Stevens repeatedly reminds us that the defendant is innocent as a
matter of law. Id. at 404, 409. "Not only is such a person presumptively
innocent as a matter of law; as a factual matter the prosecutor's interest in
obtaining a covenant not to sue will be strongest in those cases in which he
realizes that the defendant was innocent and was wrongfully accused." Id. at
409. The reader is asked to construe the masculine gender used in this and
all other extracts in the generic sense, to include women as well as men.
87. "The State is spared the necessity of going to trial, but its
willingness to drop the charge completely indicates that it might not have
proceeded with the prosecution in any event." Id. at 410.
88. Id. at 411.
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cisms, must be tested by the adversary process. 89 Justice Stevens stressed that regardless of the value or merit of a
particular § 1983 claim, the defendant who relinquishes that
claim in exchange for criminal exoneration is paying a price
unrelated to his- possible criminal behavior. 90 For example, a
defendant's giving up a claim against the police that is worth
$1000 is functionally equivalent to his paying $1000 to the
police department's retirement benefit fund.9 '
Supporters of the release-dismissal agreement cite the efficiency argument as. a major basis for allowing these procedures.9 2 justice Stevens pointed out, though, that the Court's
decision in this case defeats its own goal by creating the necessity of examining the merits of each agreement to determine its
enforceability. At the same time, the efficiency argument is
particularly weak in that, while proposing judicial economy,
it
93
encourages inattention to potential conflicts of interest.
In addition to its argument that Rumery's agreement is
defective due to its coercive nature and unfair price, the dissent
argues that these agreements are presumptively invalid because
they force the.prosecutor in such cases improperly to represent
three potentially conflicting interests: in this case, the interests
of the state, the police, and the complaining witness. The primary duty of the prosecutor is to represent the sovereign's
94
interest in the effective enforcement of the criminal law.
Viewing this issue from the standpoint of that duty, Justice Stevens declared that the release-dismissal agreement in this case
was both unnecessary and unjustified, "for both the prosecutor
and the State of New Hampshire enjoy absolute immunity from
common-law and § 1983 liability arising out of a prosecutor's
decision to initiate criminal proceedings." 95 Because Rumery's
agreement gave the state and the prosecutor no additional pro89. Id. Supporters of the release-dismissal agreement analogize it to
plea bargaining as an efficient and acceptable means of resolving cases
without litigation. The plea bargain analogy is faulty, though, because in that
situation the defendant admits guilt, while in the release-dismissal situation
the defendant must be presumed to be innocent. Id. at 409.
90. "Whatever the true value of a § 1983 claim may be, a defendant
who is required to give up such a claim in exchange for a dismissal of a
criminal charge is being forced to pay a price that is unrelated to his possible
wrongdoing as reflected in that charge." Id. at 411.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 395-96.
93. Id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 412; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
95. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman,.424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
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tection, the contract was irrelevant in terms of the prosecutor's
primary duty.
The main function and duty of prosecutors may likely be
clouded by allowing other interests to influence their judgment. Justice Stevens cited the prosecutor's ethical obligation
to exercise independent judgment and to avoid potentially conflicting interests. 9 6 Prosecutors who involve the state in
release-dismissal agreements extend, and often neglect, their
duty to represent the state. The public is entitled to a decision
of whether to prosecute that is made independently of outside
concerns. By seeking to protect law enforcement officials from
civil liability, prosecutors impair their ability to serve that public interest.
The plurality mentioned and the concurrence emphasized
the interest of protecting Mary Deary as an acceptable rationale
for entering into and enforcing the Rumery agreement. They
cited Deary's emotional distress, her unwillingness to testify
against Rumery, and the necessity of her testimony in the sexual assault case as reasons supporting the release-dismissal
agreement. 97 Justices Powell and O'Connor are only half right.
96. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY Canon 5 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a)
(1992)[hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE DR 7-103 ("A public
prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges
are not supported by probable cause."); MODEL CODE EC 7-14 ("A
government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should
refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair.").
97. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 415. The Court stated "Mary Deary did not
want to testify against Mr. Rumery." Id. at 390. The Court further noted:
[I]n this case the prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason
to make this agreement directly related to his prosecutorial
responsibilities. The agreement foreclosed both the civil and
criminal trials concerning Rumery, in which Deary would have been
a key witness. She therefore was spared the public scrutiny and
embarrassment she would have endured if she had had to testify in
either of those cases. Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney
testified in the District Court that this was a significant consideration
in the prosecutor's decision.
Id. at 398. Finally, the Court noted:
Mary Deary's emotional distress, her unwillingness to testify against
Rumery, presumably in later civil as well as criminal proceedings,
and the necessity of her testimony in the pending sexual assault case
against David Champy all support the prosecutor's judgment that
the charges against Rumery should be dropped if further injury to
Deary, and therefore to the Champy case, could thereby be avoided.
Id. at 403 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The dissent also discussed several
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While the "dismissal" portion of the agreement was justified
under these facts, the support for the "release" half of the bargain was shaky at best. Lack of evidence, represented in this
case in the form of a reluctant witness, justified dropping the
charges against the defendant. However, while a weak casejustifies dropping charges, it does not justify exonerating the
police who may have acted wrongfully.
As Justice Stevens wrote, "there is no reason to fashion a
rule that either requires or permits a prosecutor always to defer
to the interests of a witness." 9 Rather, it is often the case that
prosecutors are not able to pursue the interest of protecting
victims while still fulfilling their law enforcement duty to the
sovereign. 9 9 Where the two interests conflict, the duty of the
prosecutor toward just law enforcement must take precedence
over both protecting a fragile witness and ensuring success in
another case. 0 0 Neither the interest in sparing Deary the suffering of testifying at Rumery's trial nor the necessity of her
testimony at Champy's trial justified foreclosing a victim of
wrongful police behavior from pursuing his constitutional
rights.
In its third argument, the dissent stated that the relevant
public interests upon which the plurality based their votes did
not outweigh the public interest embodied and reflected in the
very existence of § 1983. The "relevant public interests" to
which the plurality and Justice O'Connor refer are three.' 0 '
First, because not all § 1983 suits are meritorious, enforcing
release-dismissal agreements is correct because they protect
officials from the burdens of defending unjust claims. Second,
traditional judicial deference to the prosecutor's choice of
whom to prosecute calls for allowing these agreements. Third,
the interest in protecting Mary Deary
and witnesses like her
10 2
support allowing the agreements.
The dissent believed that the merits of open civil litigation
and remedy to the person harmed strongly outweighed the
times Dreary's unwillingness to testify against Rumery and her emotional distress. See id. at 406 n.5, 410 n. 11, 416 n. 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. "There will be cases in which the prosecutor has a plain duty to
obtain critical testimony despite the desire of the witness to remain
anonymous or to avoid a courtroom confrontation with an offender." Id.
100. "It would plainly be unwise for the Court to hold that a releasedismissal agreement is enforceable simply because it affords protection to a
potential witness." Id.
101. Id. at 398.
102. Id.
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interest in avoiding the expense and inconvenience of litigation.'
As for the Court's protection of the second "relevant
public interest," judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion
is significant, but again, while that argument supports the dismissal of criminal charges, it does not support the release of
civil claims. Finally, the impropriety of promoting the interest
of a witness at the expense of the law enforcement duty cannot
be supported.
In response to the Court's statement of the relevant public
interests supporting their holding, the dissent examined the
interests embodied in § 1983." ° 4 The policies supporting the
statute are the federal interests in providing a remedy for civil
violations caused by law officers as well as the desire to have
these claims resolved publicly. If these interests could be so
easily defeated by an agreement, the purpose and strength of
§ 1983 would be significantly weakened. The plurality's reasoning seemed to be based on the unspoken premise that the
burden of litigation on society is so heavy as to outweigh the
benefits provided by § 1983. If the facts are to be assessed that
way, said Justice Stevens, the statute and its purposes should
not be circumvented, but rather the statute should be
repealed. 10 5 Until Congress takes that action, though, the
courts must respect their decision to "attach greater importance to the benefits associated with access to a federal
remedy
06
than to the burdens of defending these cases."'
IV.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The Rumery dissenters attempted to prevent the enforcement of that particular release-dismissal agreement. While
their opinion stressed that there should be a strong presumption against enforcing the agreements, even the dissenters on
the Court were reluctant to create a per se rule which would
eliminate the agreement altogether.1° After Rumery, we must
conclude that to rid our society of these instruments, the legal
profession itself must adopt the attitude that lawyers should
not enter into these "odious agreements," and that the courts
should not enforce them.
While Dixon's holding and Stevens' dissent represent the
more professional and rational approach to the issue, they do
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418.
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not carry the legal authority to require courts to follow their
directive. Although the Supreme Court achieved only a plurality in favor of enforcement, it is doubtful that it will speak on
this issue again soon. Some states may wait for that day, and
the practice of trading civil rights for non-judicial acquittal will
continue, but individual states may act now through a number
of means. Alternatively, they may enact legislation which outlaws the agreements. An even more effective course, however,
and the one in the spirit of Dixon, would be for states' professional ethics bodies to forbid prosecutors from ever utilizing
the tool of the release-dismissal agreement.
In their discussion of the issue, the Rumery courts, both at
the appellate and Supreme Court levels, concentrated primarily on the rights of the defendant and the interests of the public.' 0 8 The Justices correctly examined the possibility of
coercion inherent in the agreements and balanced the relevant
public interests that would both be served and harmed by
allowing them to exist. The dissent concentrated on the competing interests the prosecutor inconsistently served, 0 9 and
Justice O'Connor mentioned in detail the "dangers" lurking
behind the agreements." 0 None of the opinions stated,
though, that these agreements were ethically wrong. No one
questioned whether utilizing these agreements is unprofessional. No one explored the possibility that American Bar
Association standards themselves might implicitly reject these
agreements as "unethical" or, at the very least "unprofessional." The following section argues that, for several reasons,
prosecutors should not enter into release-dismissal agreements
because the practice that is legal in the eyes of the Supreme
Court is unethical according to our own professional norms.
A.

"Systematic Inequality"

As the plurality in Rumery admitted, even criminal defendants who believe their defenses are meritorious are often intimidated by "the risk, publicity, and expense of a criminal
trial.""' It is unlikely, though, that the arrestee's threat of a
civil suit is as intimidating to the prosecutor as is the prosecutor's threat of indictment and trial. This fact supports
Rumery's claim that release-dismissal agreements are "inherently coercive," and as such should not be allowed. The inher108.
109.
110.
111.

See discussion supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393.
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ent coerciveness stems from the unequal positionsl of the
prosecutor and the defendant, and this systematic inequality
of
12
bargaining power renders the agreement suspect."
The Rumery plurality stated that the defendant's intimidation and unequal position vis-a-vis the prosecutor do not justify
invalidating release-dismissal agreements because the inequality of position between prosecutor and defendant is regularly
tolerated in plea bargains."13 The prosecutorial threat which
produces a plea arrangement may seem similar to that which
produces a release-dismissal agreement, but as Justice Stevens
reminds us, there are important distinctions between the two
situations.'
Plea bargains are public, judicially supervised,
and involve an admission of guilt. Release-dismissal agreements are private and made outside of judicial scrutiny, and,
perhaps most importantly, defendants who give up their civil
rights claims to avoid prosecution are presumed to be innocent. Further, as Justice Stevens stated, the "mutuality of
advantage" that supports plea bargaining is not present in
release-dismissal agreements. 115
Where in a plea bargain the terms of the bargain are
related to the strength of each side's case, a release-dismissal
agreement "exacts a price unrelated to the character of the
defendant's own conduct.""' 6 The nature and strength of the
two claims are unrelated; a civil rights claim has no bearing on
the defendant's guilt or innocence. Verita Boyd's dismissal of
police brutality charges was in exchange for a dismissal of a
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charge."1 7 Miller Dixon
was stopped for obscure traffic violations - failing to obey the
instructions given by a police officer and stopping a vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct the orderly flow of traffic - which
were only prosecuted as a vindictive response to his own civil
complaint."' These examples illustrate what Justice Stevens
must have meant when he stated that the defendant who
releases his civil claim in exchange for dismissal of a criminal
112. See PETER W. Low &JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
429 (1988).
113. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393.
114. Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 411.
117. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
118. Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 966 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
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to the possible
charge is "forced to pay a price that is unrelated
' i1 9
wrongdoing as reflected in that charge."
The systematic inequality of the agreement supports an
argument that the government's objective in obtaining the
agreement is not legitimate. As Justice Stevens pointed out,
the prosecutors' strongest interest in entering into these agreements exist when the defendant is both innocent and deprived
of constitutional rights.120 Unlike settling a criminal case with a
plea bargain, the prosecutor is admitting the defendant's innocence by dropping the charges. The cases which present the
prosecutor with the strongest incentives to make this agreement are those in which the defendant is most deserving of
relief. 12 1 Such a benefit, which the prosecutor receives from
the defendant's willingness to forego a civil rights claim, is not
one for which the prosecutor should legitimately be allowed to
bargain. It is rather less than admirable to allow the superior
position of the prosecutor to deprive an individual of vindication of constitutional claims. The release-dismissal agreement
is invalid, then, both because of the inequality between the two
is pursuing an interest that
parties and because the government
22
does not deserve merit.'
B.

Existing Codes of Legal Ethics

Admittedly, the American Bar Association does not explicitly disallow the release-dismissal agreement. There is precious
little, short of the obvious, which the current standards governing the practice of law explicitly forbids. It seems, though,
119. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
121. This is especially true if the Dixon court was correct in its assertion
that the these agreements encourage prosecutors to "trump up charges" in
order to protect police from their own misconduct. Imagine, for example, a
case where a person is arrested without probable cause, is innocent and is
physically brutalized during the course of the arrest. That person would have
a strong civil rights case; simultaneously, the prosecutor who is seeking to
protect the police would have the strongest incentive to enter into a releasedismissal agreement. While such a situation presents the obvious conclusion
that the prosecutor should simply drop the charges regardless of the
defendant's possible suit against the police, it is possible that the prosecutor
could threaten to prosecute and then use the agreement as a mechanism to
protect the police and the municipality. This was the position advanced by
the Dixon court. See also Kreimer, supra note 12, at 865, whose empirical study

showed that "rather than constituting a means by which impartial prosecutors
screen out frivolous civil rights actions, these situations appear to represent a
method for municipal attorneys to routinely eliminate section 1983 claims
against their clients." Id.
122.

Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 112, at 430.
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that anyone arguing for a per se rule against enforcement of
release-dismissal agreements could and should present the
argument that it is wrong, by ethical and professional standards, to be a party to such an agreement.
23
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
reminds us that lawyers are "guardians of the law" and bear the
consequent obligation "to maintain the highest standards of
professional conduct." 124 This proposed law of ethics purports
to guide lawyers toward what is right and wrong, or at least
toward what is acceptable and unacceptable, professional and
unprofessional. In terms of this "guide," to act unprofessionally is tantamount to
acting unethically, and to be deserving of
5
official sanctions. 12
The Code, in its guidance function, sets forth "ethical considerations" for lawyers. It is there, if anywhere, where a lawyer will
find standards
of professionalism.
These
considerations are merely considerations; the Preamble to the
Code refers to them as "aspirational in character" but certainly
not mandatory.12 6 The ABA did create Disciplinary Rules
which are mandatory and which state the "minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action." 127 Those very rudimentary rules do not
shed much light on the problem at hand.
Within the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility, there is neither an Ethical Consideration nor a Disciplinary Rule which forbids a public prosecutor from entering into
an agreement with a criminal defendant to dismiss charges in
exchange for a civil release. Prosecutors will not find such an
obligation within the current Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, either. However, we may deduce unethical or at
least unprofessional conduct that should be forbidden by the
123. This article concentrates more on the ABA standards as outlined
in the Code of Professional Responsibility than on the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility because the Model Rules fail, in large part, to
address the issues presented herein. While the Code is now considered
obsolete in many jurisdictions, as it has been superseded by the Model Rules,
it is cited for its value as a traditional guide for professional responsibility.
124. MODEL CODE, supra note 96, pmbl.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.1 (e) (1982) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS]:
"As used in this chapter, the term 'unprofessional conduct'
denotes conduct which, in either identical or similar language, is or should be
made subject to disciplinary sanctions pursuant to codes of professional
responsibility in each jurisdiction."
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Code and the Rules through analogies drawn and arguments
based on the aspirations and minimum standards that we do
have.
Because the Code itself is largely silent on the special
duties of prosecutors, it may be assumed that they are to be
held to the same ethical standards as other lawyers, with the
state acting as *the"client." 2 ' According to Canon 5, "a lawyer
should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client."' 2 9 The Ethical Considerations within that Canon
state that "the professional judgment of a lawyer should be
exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of
his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties."1
Further, "the obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf of his client requires that
he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free
judgment.''" 3 ' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct reiterate the mandate that lawyers should not limit their representation of clients by responsibilities to third parties.'
As Justice Stevens stated in the Rumery dissent, a prosecutor is practically unable to serve the competing interests
involved in the release-dismissal practice and still fulfill the
duties required by these ethical mandates. 3 3 When the interest in protecting the police thwarts the interest of serving the
people, as is often the case when a defendant accused of a violent crime is freed without investigation or trial, the prosecutor
fails in her ethical obligation by facilitating, rather than disregarding, the desires of a third party. The Model Rules, which
are the relevant authority in most jurisdictions, also forbid conflicts of interest which involve the prosecutor's serving the
interests of a third party rather than the interests of the client.'s4 Releasing a defendant in order to protect individual
officers or a municipality, rather than pursuing a criminal case
in service to the state, is the type of situation which both the
Code and the Rules forbid.
The Code and the Model Rules state that "the responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo128.

But see

MODEL

CODE,

supra

note

96,

Canon

7,

and

text

accompanying note 98.
129. Id. Cannon 5.
130. Id. EC 5-1.
131. Id. EC 5-21.
132.
133.

MODEL RULES, supra note 96, Rule 1.7.
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 415 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
134.

MODEL RULES, supra note 96, Rule 1.7(b).
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cate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." 135 This
"special duty" springs from the fact that the prosecutor represents the sovereign and it includes the employment of
"restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute."' 3 6 The
prosecutor bears the duty to see justice done; that duty
includes attempting to convict suspected criminals or, in the
alternative, to dismiss unjust charges. It is not the proper duty
of the prosecutor, however, to protect the police from their
own misconduct,1 7 nor is it the prosecutor's proper duty to
spare witnesses like Mary Deary from the discomfort of testifying. It is quite likely that engaging in behavior which tends to
those ends will only compromise the prosecutor's original duty
of law enforcement.
The ABA has also promulgated Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice,'13 and it is there that we
would expect to find an explicit rejection of the practice of
release-dismissal agreements. While that is not the case, we
again see that the proper function of the prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict.'3 9 These standards further
resemble the Code as tailored to public service, rather than private service, in their mandate of avoiding conflict of interest
with respect to official duties. 40 These standards may not
clearly and unequivocally answer our question, but they certainly support the conviction that, based at least on duty and
conflict of interest principles, the prosecutor should not compromise her position by engaging in release-dismissal bargains.
Courts have begun to consider release-dismissal agreements in light of the ethical standards described above. For
example, in 1989, the Court of Appeals of New York considered release-dismissal agreements in light of the Supreme
135. MODEL CODE, supra note 96, EC 7-13; MODEL RULES, supra note 96,
Rule 3.8.
136. MODEL CODE, supra note 96, EC 7-13.
137. The Court stated in Rumery:
It is no part of the proper duty of a prosecutor to use a criminal
prosecution to forestall a civil proceeding by the defendant against
policemen, even where the civil case arises from the events that are
also the basis for the criminal charge. What he cannot do is
condition a voluntary dismissal of a charge upon a stipulation by the
defendant that is designed to forestall the latter's civil case.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 414 n.17 (quoting MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373,
375 (9th Cir. 1970)).
138. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 127.
139. Id. Standard 3-1.1(c).
140. Id. Standard 3-1.2.

356

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

Court's ruling in Rumery. In Cowles v. Brownell,14' basing much
of its reasoning on ethical considerations, the court held that
"the integrity of the criminal justice system mandates that an
agreement made in the circumstances presented not be
enforced by the courts."' 4 2 The case arose when Cowles sued
an arresting officer for malicious prosecution, false arrest,
assault and battery. The officer moved for summary judgment,
based on the ground that the plaintiff had previously released
all claims against the officer. The court refused to dismiss the
suit, finding that the prosecutor's conditional dismissal of the
criminal charges upon the relinquishment of Cowles' civil
claims was unrelated to the merits of the People's case, and,
consequently, there remained unresolved factual allegations
regarding Cowles' conduct. There were equally unresolved
allegations against the District Attorney's office, which stood
"accused of routinely demanding such waivers in order to pro1 43
tect a police officer whose misdeeds it knows."'
As did the Rumery dissent, the majority in the New York
case refused to enforce a specific release-dismissal agreement
but did not promulgate a per se rule invalidating the agreements. 44 Although the result may not be exactly what critics
of the agreements are seeking, the Cowles case is significant in
that it examines the ethical considerations and professional
responsibilities that the prosecutor compromised in that case.
The New York court, like Justice Stevens in Rumery, was
extremely concerned with the conflicts of interest to which
prosecutors expose themselves in release-dismissal situations.145 According to the court, protecting the police from
civil liability is not the duty of the prosecutor. Rather, prosecutors bear the obligation to represent the People, and to fulfill
that obligation, they must exercise independent judgment in
deciding whether or not to prosecute.146 The court found that
this obligation to the people "cannot be fulfilled when the
prosecutor undertakes also to represent a police officer for reasons divorced from any criminal justice concern. To enforce a
release-dismissal agreement under these circumstances is sim' 47
ply to encourage violation of the prosecutor's obligation."'
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

538 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.

146.
147.

Id.
Id.
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The New York court also considered the prosecutor's ethical obligation to avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety. 48 That obligation includes the fact that "a lawyer
should promote public confidence in our system and in the
legal profession."'14 9 This duty springs from the fact that on
occasion the conduct of a lawyer may appear to the lay person
to be unethical. The New York court decided not to enforce
the release-dismissal agreement in this case because it was concerned about both the conflict of interest inherent in the situation and the appearance of impropriety that would stem from
publicly allowing such a bargain. 5 °
The principal concern in these cases, and an argument
relied upon by the Rumery plurality, is whether or not the agreements advance public interest. In no way is that interest fur51
thered by the agreement exemplified in the Cowles case.'
Instead of furthering any public benefit, these agreements
eliminate both the public's ability to seek justice against a possible criminal wrongdoer and the public's right to assess the
possible constitutional violation of one of its officials. In terms
of ethical obligations, if the criminal behavior truly occurred,
and could have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the
prosecutor owed a duty to the state to pursue prosecution.
Conversely, if the charges were false, or the case unprovable,
the prosecutor was ethically obligated to dismiss the charges at
no price to the defendant. In either situation requiring a
release of civil rights for the dismissal is unethical.' 5 2
148. Id. (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 96, Canon 9); see also MODEL
supra note 96, Rule 3.1 (regarding Meritorious Claims and
Contentions) & Rule 3.8 (regarding the Special Duties of Prosecutors).
RULES,

149.

MODEL CODE,

supra note 96, Canon 9.

150. "The record in this case demonstrates that the practice of
requiring the release of civil claims in exchange for dismissal of charges
simply to insulate a municipality or its employees from liability can engender
at least an appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest." Cowles, 538
N.E.2d at 326-27.
151. "Insofar as the integrity of the criminal justice system was
concerned - the paramount interest here - on this record there was no
benefit, only a loss." Id. at 327.
152. The Cowles court stated that:
Assuming plaintiff to have been guilty of the criminal charges
leveled against him (as the prosecutor maintains), the People's
interest in seeing a wrongdoer punished has not been vindicated.
Assuming him to have been innocent (as he maintains), or the case
against him to have been unprovable, the prosecutor was under an
ethical obligation to drop the charges without exacting any price for
doing so.
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As well as requiring unethical conduct on the part of the
prosecutor, these agreements leave unanswered questions
about officers' conduct. That fact further supports the conclusion that the minimal public interest served by these agreements do not overcome the dangers they pose. Rather, as the
New York court held, "the agreement may be viewed as undermining the legitimate interests of the criminal justice system
53
solely to protect against the possibility of civil liability.'
C.

The Purposes of § 1983

The Rumery plurality cited three "relevant public interests"
supporting their holding: avoidance of the expense and inconvenience of litigation, judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion, and protection of the victim of the crime. 154 The
holding reached by the Rumery plurality suggests that these
interests are so important to society that they outweigh the
interests promoted by § 1983. ' As Justice Stevens reminded
us though, we should be disconcerted by the fact that the benefits, goals and purposes of § 1983 may so easily be circumvented by an agreement. One need only examine the goals of
the statute to conclude that Congress must not have intended
such a result.
An award of damages against a public official for the misuse of government power promotes two obvious objectives:
compensation to victims and deterrence from further misconduct. The Supreme Court has identified compensation of the
victims of official misconduct as "the basic purpose of a § 1983
damages award."' 5 6 This "basic purpose" is obviously
defeated by the release-dismissal agreement. While a dismissed arrestee may now avoid the threat of prosecution, that
person still carries the injuries of the official misconduct and, if
the injuries are physical, the medical costs related to the
incident.
The second objective of a § 1983 damages award, deterrence of future misconduct, is achieved when "[a]n award of
damages against one official conveys to others a threat of similar treatment if they too misbehave."' 5 7 This purpose is similarly defeated by releasing the officer without a public
recognition of the injury inflicted. The wholly private nature of
153.

Id.

154.
155.
156.

See supra notes 58-65, 101-02 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).

157.

Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 112, at 42.
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these agreements - unlike plea bargains or civil settlements,
they are not judicially supervised not publicly recorded - not
only evades the deterrence purpose of § 1983 but actually
undermines it by possibly encouraging officials to misbehave.15 8 However, such a suspicion that police will actually
take advantage of these agreements' existence in order to
intentionally brutalize arrestees is not necessary to prove the
point that the agreements undermine the deterrent aspect of
§ 1983. The statute was intended to discourage misconduct.
By rendering it impotent by denying its use, the effect of these
agreements is to encourage disregard or indifference to an
arrestee's constitutional rights.
Additionally, perhaps the most important goal furthered
by § 1983 litigation is that § 1983 damage awards "are one way
of affirming legal rights and thus of educating the moral sentiments of the community."159 The damage awards themselves
are often nominal. Indeed, in many cases the bankruptcy of
municipalities renders them judgment-proof, and individual
police officers generally have no "deep pockets." As a result,
money is not the motivation to pursue a § 1983 claim. Rather,
the importance of litigating claims under the statute is to publicly air official misconduct, which publicity may help to further
the goals of compensation and deterrence of future wrongs.
The "cover-up" nature of the release-dismissal agreement is
perhaps its most invidious characteristic. It is probable that
most members of the public would prefer to have criminals
prosecuted, if there is probable cause of their guilt enough to
indict them, rather than be released for a reason unrelated to
their arrest. Presumably, most people probably do not wish
their public officials to engage in constitutional violations and
then be protected from suit by local prosecutors.
158. See supra notes 44, 59, 120-121, and accompanying text. It has
been theorized that prosecutors may consciously use the agreements to
protect police from their misconduct, but it may be unnecessarily cynical to
assume that police will purposely engage in unconstitutional practices if these
agreements continue to exist. While some officers may rationally choose to
violate individuals' rights, it seems that most cases of misbehavior arise out of
anger or ignorance. Although the release-dismissal option may not send a
specific signal to officers that their misconduct is acceptable, the elimination
of § 1983 claims may eventually lead to the same result. So while the
continued existence of these agreements may not affirmatively encourage
misbehavior, the lack of punishment for these incidents implies that civil
rights are not worth respect because no one is ever punished for violating
them.
159. Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 112, at 42.
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The Application of § 1983

The Rumery plurality and concurrence relied heavily on
concerns for judicial economy to support their approval of the
release-dismissal agreement in that case. Justices Powell and
O'Connor each cited a concern to avoid "frivolous" and
unfairly burdensome lawsuits against municipalities and
officers as a compelling rationale to allow individuals to bargain away civil rights claims. 6 ' An examination of the technical aspects surrounding § 1983 litigation demonstrates,
however, that that very concern has been provided for by judicial interpretation of the statute which has greatly narrowed its
application. Specifically, the qualified immunities granted to
individual officers make it difficult for a plaintiff to pursue an
action, and the situations in which a municipality will ever be
found liable are very limited. In short, it is extremely difficult
for a plaintiff to get past a motion to dismiss, even if that plaintiff has a case which seems meritorious. A study of official
immunity and municipal liability in relation to § 1983 cases will
show that Justices Powell and O'Connor's concerns about frivolous lawsuits are unfounded, and that for a prosecutor to
enter into a release-dismissal agreement to support that rationale is both unnecessary and immoral.
1. Official Immunity
The common law traditionally recognizes the necessity of
permitting government officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability.161 This
official executive immunity stems from two interdependent
rationales: first, "the injustice .

.

. of subjecting to liability an

officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position,
to exercise discretion," and, second, "the danger that the
threat of such liability would deter [that officer's] willingness to
execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good."' 162 Police officers, accordingly,
enjoy "qualified immunity" from liability from damages under
§ 1983.163
It is presumed that a police officer who commits a constitutional deprivation is immune from suit. The rule is that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974).
Id. at 240.
Id.
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duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' 6 4 This qualified immunity is defeated, then, when
the officer who committed the deprivation knew or reasonably
should have known that he was violating some clearly established constitutional standard.' 6 5 The significance of the existence of this objective rule of qualified immunity is that the first
step in any § 1983 case will be to determine this threshold
question, and until that question is resolved discovery will not
be allowed.' 6 6
The practical consequence of qualified immunity is that
many § 1983 cases will not survive long enough to even reach
the discovery stage of a lawsuit. The immunity defense is usually pleaded as the defendant-officer's first response to the
complaint, in the form of a motion to dismiss. For example,
the officer will plead that there was no clearly established constitutional or statutory rule which governed the particular situation, or that the state of the law on that particular situation was
unclear. Further, if there was such a clearly established rule,
officers may plead that they were reasonable in not knowing
about it. Consequently, unless there was not such a rule of law
about which an officer should have known, the court will dismiss the case at the initial stage.
The rule of qualified immunity has obvious implications in
the release-dismissal debate. Thanks to the tough standard
that § 1983 plaintiffs must surmount just to proceed beyond a
motion to dismiss, Justices Powell and O'Connor need not be
concerned about officers being overburdened with frivolous
complaints. Unless the act the officer performed was clearly
illegal, that officer is immune from suit.
2.

Municipal Liability

Because individual officers may be immune from suit or be
practically judgment proof, § 1983 plaintiffs may wish to sue
the deeper pocket of the municipality, as was the case in
Rumery. As a rule, a municipality may be held liable for the constitutional deprivations performed by its officers. The
Supreme Court has held that "[l]ocal governing bodies ...

can

be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief."' 6 7 That liability is limited, however, in that
164.
165.
166.
167.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Id.
Id.
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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"the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 168
The local government's liability may not be based only on injuries inflicted by its employees, though; municipalities may not
be held liable merely under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Rather, "it is when execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. ' "169
Unless a municipality employs a policy or custom of
depriving individuals of their constitutional rights, it will not be
liable for the wrongful acts of its officers. The implications of
this rule of municipal liability appear in the example of the
Rodney King beating incident of March, 1991, and the pending
federal civil suit arising from that incident. Even though the
physical evidence in that case lends strong sympathetic support
for holding the Los Angeles Police Department liable for
King's physical injuries, it seems that proving the municipality's
liability will be the "major stumbling block" in the § 1983 damages action.' 70 Because municipal liability cannot be established under a vicarious liability theory, King will be required
to prove that the officers were acting according to an official
policy or custom of the L.A. Police Department.' 7 ' As noted
earlier, the individual officers are not the "deep pockets" that
civil plaintiffs are seeking. One law professor noted that withliability "you've won the battle but lost the
out municipal
2
war.'

17

The law shows that a release-dismissal agreement will only
be necessary, then, to protect a municipality who as a matter of
policy employs unconstitutional practices. One is only left to
wonder why, then, these prosecutors who are servants of the
people, members of communities, and officers of the court
want to support such practices by allowing them to continue.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.

170.

Stephanie B. Goldberg, Federal Lawsuits for Rodney King Raise New

Issues, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 76.
171.

A showing that the department was deliberately indifferent to the

training and conduct of its officers may establish the "policy or custom"
necessary to prove liability. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
172. Goldberg, supra note 170 (quoting Peter L. Davis, Touro College,
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, New York, N.Y.).
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V.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the release-dismissal agreement may be enforced, if it is negotiated under the
proper circumstances. While the Court gives permission to
enter into these agreements, that judicial statement is no mandate for prosecutors to continue this practice, or for ethics
associations to permit it.
As a largely self-governing profession, lawyers take pride
in their ability to regulate themselves through such bodies as
the ABA and state bar associations. The preamble to the
Model Rules states that "the legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government."' 7 3 Further, "the profession has a responsibility to
assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest
and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns
of the bar."' 7 4 These statements would support any action
states may take, through their own bar associations, to discourage the practice of entering into release-dismissal agreements.
In 1982, the Colorado Bar Association declared that "it is
improper for a public prosecutor to require that a defendant,
as a condition of charging or sentencing concessions, release
governmental agencies or their agents from actual or potential
civil claims which arise from the same transactions as the criminal episode."' 7 5 The Colorado Bar based its opinion on the
ABA's statement that "[t]he responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."' .7 6 If courts are currently
unable to interpret the concepts that it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests 77 and that the primary duty of a
public prosecutor is not merely to convict, but to see that justice is done, 178 as expressions disallowing the practice of dismissing charges for the release of civil claims, then individual
states should follow Colorado's example and expressly prohibit
the use of these agreements.

MODEL RULES, supra note 96, pmbl.
174. Id.
175. Colorado Bar Ass'n., Ethics Opinion No. 62 (Nov. 20, 1982)
(regarding duties of a public prosecutor), reprinted in 12 COLO. LAw. 455
(1983).
176. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 127, Standard 3-1.1(c);
173.

MODEL CODE, supra note 96, EC 7-13.
177. MODEL CODE, supra note 96, Canon 5.

178.

Id. EC 7-13.

